point in the return journey from the Montreal airport to the
motel where they were all staying.
 Gopie shared a room with Gittens at that motel. Gittens’
suitcase — given to her by Wilson’s contact in St. Maarten —
was first delivered to the motel room she shared with Gopie.
 On November 23, Gopie went to the airport with Gittens
and Fraser (and others) where they attempted to retrieve
Fraser’s “lost” luggage. Gopie texted Fraser within moments of
her arrest, telling her to answer the phone because it was “John”
 This evidence, if believed, could result in Gopie’s conviction
for conspiracy to import a narcotic. It reasonably supports the
inference that Gopie was part of the plan to import a narcotic into
Canada, along with Wilson and Fraser. I note also that this is not
the type of case in which accumulated judicial experience suggests
that the jury’s verdict might be unreasonable. Finally, as I have
already indicated, this evidence shows why it was not unreasonable for the jury to have convicted Gopie of conspiracy to import
a narcotic while acquitting him on the importing count.
 Therefore, I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
2. Was the jury charge inadequate?
 In his factum, Gopie argued that the charge did not fairly
guide the jury (a) through the relevant evidence as it applied to
the law of conspiracy; (b) on the relevance of expert evidence
given by Constable Palanuk; and (c) on the exculpatory effects of
the evidence of Fraser, Sargeant and Palanuk.
 In oral argument, Gopie abandoned the latter two submissions. Therefore, I will address only his first submission, the
substance of which is that the trial judge failed to fairly summarize the whole of the evidence relevant to step two of the Carter1
analysis. In effect, he contends that the trial judge erred because
he set out the evidence directly admissible against Gopie on step
two but did not point out other evidence (or lack thereof) suggesting that Gopie was in Montreal simply to party and hang
out with friends.
 I do not accept this submission.
(a) The relevant legal principles
 A functional approach must be taken when assessing the
adequacy of jury instructions — they must be tested against
1 R. v. Carter,  1 S.C.R. 938,  S.C.J. No. 47.