she returned, Gopie (and others) went to the airport to pick her
up; on the way back to the Montreal motel, Gopie told Wilson to
leave Fraser alone when she was complaining about her “lost”
luggage; Gopie (and others) stayed at the motel during the
period that Fraser was trying to retrieve her luggage; and Gopie
accompanied Fraser to the airport when she went to try and get
her “lost” luggage.
 After reviewing the evidence relevant to Gopie, the trial
judge reviewed for the jury the relevant evidence of Sargeant’s
own acts and words.
 Following that, the trial judge instructed the jury on step
three of Carter. He explained that if the jury concluded, on the
evidence of each accused’s own words and conduct, that they
were probably members of the conspiracy, they had to go on to
determine whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Gopie and Sargeant were members of the conspiracy.
 The trial judge carefully explained the legal parameters
circumscribing what other evidence the jury could consider in
making that determination. He followed with a review of the
evidence that the jury could consider, in addition to that which
he had already reviewed with them. In this review of the relevant evidence, the trial judge thoroughly described the cross-examination of each of Fraser and Sargeant and, in so doing,
he provided the defence position and context for Gopie’s actions
which Gopie now complains are missing in the instruction at
step two of Carter.
 It is within this context that I return to a consideration of
Gopie’s complaint about the jury instruction at step two of
Carter. As Gopie concedes, the trial judge’s instructions made
clear to the jury the factual issue it had to decide: based on
Gopie’s own acts and words, was he probably a member of
the conspiracy? As well, Gopie makes no complaint about the
instruction on the law applicable to that issue. I note also that
immediately prior to setting out the relevant evidence of Gopie’s
acts and words, the trial judge instructed the jury that mere
knowledge of the common unlawful purpose was not sufficient
nor was mere presence or mere association with others who
were members of the conspiracy. In this context, I simply see
nothing in the contention that the jury charge was inadequate at
step two of Carter.
 The instructions gave the jury the tools it needed to
determine the issue based on the evidence. The fact that some of
the contextual considerations associated with that evidence were
amplified in the instruction at step three of Carter does not
mean that the instruction at step two was flawed.