emergency on the part of the accused, important witnesses,
counsel or the trial judge (Jordan, at paras. 71-72).
 The period of delay caused by discrete events must be
subtracted from the net delay — yielding the “resulting delay” —
for the purposes of determining whether the presumptive ceiling
has been reached. If the resulting delay exceeds the presumptive
ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex, such that the time the case took was justified and
the delay reasonable (Jordan, at paras. 75-80).
 If the resulting delay falls below the presumptive ceiling,
the onus shifts to the appellants to show that the delay is unreasonable. Stays beneath the ceiling are expected to be rare and
limited to clear cases (Jordan, at paras. 82-83).
 For cases in the justice system on the date of Jordan’s
release, a “transitional exceptional circumstance” applies if the
Crown satisfies the court that the time the case took is justified
based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the previous state of
the law. This is a contextual assessment, sensitive to the manner
in which the Morin framework was applied and to the fact that
the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly against a standard of which they had no notice when the proceedings began.
Considerations of prejudice and the seriousness of the offence
can inform whether the parties’ reliance on the previous state of
the law was reasonable (Jordan, at para. 96. See, also, R. v.
Pyrek,  O.J. No. 3024, 2017 ONCA 476, at paras. 9, 28).
(d) The Jordan framework applied
 The parties agree that the total delay in this case
was approximately 43.5 months and that neither Gopie nor
Sargeant waived any periods of delay. They do not agree, however, on how much of the delay is defence-caused. There are
two components to their disagreement. First, they disagree on
how to attribute delay caused by the actions of a co-accused.
Second, they disagree on whether other delay — such as that
associated with missing transcripts — should be treated as
 Gopie and Sargeant submit that neither exceptional circumstances nor transitional exceptional circumstances justify
the delay in this case. The Crown argues that the net delay
was less than 30 months but, alternatively, the delay is justified
under transitional exceptional circumstances.
 Therefore, in applying the Jordan framework, I must
determine ( i) how to attribute delay caused by the actions of
a co-accused; ( ii) whether other delay in this case should be
treated as defence-caused delay; ( iii) the net delay for each of