In my view, attributing to an accused the delay caused
by the actions or inactions of a co-accused is inconsistent with
the approach and language of Jordan. That does not mean, however, that delay caused because the matter proceeded jointly
against multiple accused is irrelevant to the s. 11(b) assessment
under Jordan. As I discuss below, delays arising in the case
of jointly charged accused can give rise to exceptional circumstances under the Jordan framework.
 Before concluding on this issue, I offer this comment
concerning delays caused by a co-accused and the implications of
the Jordan decision on this court’s decision in G. (L.).
 Pre-Jordan, co-accused delay was considered neutral
delay in the s. 11(b) assessment; it was not treated as defence
delay. The rationale was that, generally speaking, it is in the
interests of justice that individuals charged jointly with an
offence be tried together. A single trial for two or more accused
persons generally conserves judicial resources, avoids inconsistent verdicts, and avoids witnesses having to testify more
than once: see G. (L.), at para. 63, quoting from R. v. Whylie,
 O.J. No. 1127, 207 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (C.A.), at para. 24.
 Importantly, however, as this court recognized in
Whylie and R. v. Heaslip,  O.J. No. 172, 9 C.C.C. (3d) 480
(C.A.), the Crown’s legitimate interest in having jointly
charged accused tried together must be balanced against the
accused’s constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable
amount of time. As Martin J.A. stated in Heaslip, at pp. 496-97
The Crown’s desire to ensure that all the accused be tried together was, of
course, entirely proper, but it imposed a corresponding obligation on the
Crown to take appropriate measures to ensure that Garofoli’s motion pro-
ceeded expeditiously, and to move to have the application dismissed if
Garofoli’s counsel did not proceed promptly.
 This balancing of interests is evident in R. v. Topol,
 O.J. No. 535, 2008 ONCA 113, 236 O.A.C. 1, affg 
O.J. No. 3094, 160 C.R.R. (2d) 100 (S.C.J.), where this court
upheld the decision of Nordheimer J., who found that at least
some of the delay caused by scheduling difficulties among
numerous counsel had to be borne by the Crown due to the
Crown’s consistent consent to delays and initial failure to seek
severance for Topol.
 Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in R. v. Last,
 3 S.C.R. 146,  S.C.J. No. 45, 2009 SCC 45, at para.
18, whether the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable
time would be prejudiced by continuing with a joint prosecution