Gopie’s onus to establish this mitigating circumstance. He did
not discharge that onus.
[ 187] As for whether the nine-year sentence is demonstrably
unfit, I begin by noting that the Crown sought a sentence of ten
years and the defence submitted that a period of six to eight
years was the appropriate range.
[ 188] While Gopie had no criminal record, at the time of the
offence he was on probation and had been in Canada for only
two and a half years. The conspiracy was planned and detailed
and led to the importation of a large amount of hard drugs —
almost eight kilograms of cocaine. And, while Gopie was not
found to be at the top of the hierarchy as the importer, as I have
explained, it was available to the trial judge to find, as he did,
that Gopie’s role was more than tangential.
[ 189] In light of the amount and nature of the drug that was
imported and Gopie’s role in the conspiracy, the sentence cannot
be said to be demonstrably unfit.
[ 190] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal against
conviction. I would grant leave to appeal sentence but would
dismiss that appeal, as well.
[ 191] D.M. BROWN J.A. (concurring): — I concur with my colleague that the appeals from conviction and sentence should be
dismissed. I agree with her treatment of the issues of unreasonable verdict, adequacy of the jury charge, and sentence. I also
agree the application judge did not err in dismissing the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s. 11(b) Application.
[ 192] However, I respectfully disagree with one aspect of her
s. 11(b) analysis: where to consider the consequences of delay
by a co-accused in the Jordan framework [R. v. Jordan, 
1 S.C.R. 631,  S.C.J. No. 27]. My colleague would not
examine such delay as part of “defence-caused delay,” but as
a factor in the “exceptional circumstances” analysis of the complexity of the case.
[ 193] I would adopt a different approach and place the consideration of delay caused by the actions of a co-accused in the
“defence-caused delay” part of the Jordan framework. In my
view, that approach would more effectively promote Jordan’s
goal of ridding our criminal justice system of “a culture of complacency towards delay”: Jordan, at para. 40.
[ 194] I do not read Jordan as merely substituting a new way
of performing the s. 11(b) judicial days-counting exercise for
the old one. Although Jordan directs a change in the mechanics