In our view, as we will explain, each of these complaints
fails when examined in the light of the trial judge’s reasons as a
whole and the overwhelming nature of the case for the Crown.
Ground 1: Adverse credibility findings
 The appellant acknowledges that the trial judge properly
approached her credibility findings by referring to the decision
in R. v. W. (D.),  1 S.C.R. 742,  S.C.J. No. 26. Further, the appellant accepts that a trial judge’s findings on credibility attract a significant degree of deference on appeal. On the
other hand, the appellant says, appellate intervention is warranted, as here, where, on consideration of all the evidence
adduced at trial, the trial judge’s credibility determination cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence or where it depends
on a misapprehension of evidence on a material issue.
 In our view, this ground of appeal fails.
 After reciting the W. (D.) formula and reiterating the
absence of any onus on the appellant to establish his innocence,
the trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony as making
no sense in light of the text messages and the ITO which constituted the case for the Crown. It is well settled that it is open to
a trial judge to reject the testimony of an accused because of the
cumulative force of the contrary evidence adduced by the Crown:
R. v. D. (J.J.R.),  O.J. No. 4749, 215 C.C.C. (3d) 252 (C.A.),
at para. 53.
 In her lengthy and thoughtful reasons, the trial judge
identified ten aspects of the appellant’s testimony that she found
troubling and cumulatively warranted its rejection. Each of the
reasons were firmly rooted in the evidence and did not involve
speculation or invoke any prohibited chain of reasoning. The
reasons are internally consistent and not contradicted by any
findings of fact made by the trial judge.
Ground 2: Unreasonableness of conviction of perjury
 The perjury count involved an allegation that the appellant swore falsely in the ITO that source C had told him that he
(source C) had heard that Mork had a handgun used in a prior
shooting hidden in his residence.
 The appellant says that the conviction on this count is
unreasonable because the trial judge wrongly rejected a reasonable interpretation of the texts of May 16, 2012 offered by the
appellant in his testimony at trial. That interpretation was that
source C’s text supported the appellant’s conclusion that the gun
was already in Mork’s house.