The trial judge focused on deliberately embellished and intentionally omitted and misleading facts about
( i) planting the gun and setting up Mork;
( ii) the motivation of source C;
( iii) the motivation of source B; and
( iv) the presence of scales and plastic wrap.
Her conclusions on these issues were not cumbered by legal
error or misapprehension or failure to consider relevant evidence
and are plainly reasonable.
Ground 4: Unreasonableness of conviction of obstruct justice (count 3)
 The third count of the indictment alleged that the appellant attempted to obstruct justice by encouraging source C to
place a gun in Mork’s home with intent that it would be used as
evidence in a judicial proceeding.
 The appellant says that the conviction on count three was
unreasonable because it was made in the absence of any evidence that the appellant intended that the gun would be used as
evidence in any subsequent proceedings; in the face of evidence
that the appellant’s purpose was not to charge Mork for possession of the gun, rather to get the gun off the street; and without
considering two earlier text messages that tended to support the
appellant’s claim that he considered the assistance source C provided about Mork separate from the assistance source C gave in
surrendering the gun.
 We declined to give effect to this ground of appeal.
 In our view, the text message exchange on May 23, 2012,
two days before completion and submission of the ITO, provides
incontrovertible proof of the appellant’s guilt on this count.
Source C was getting cold feet about planting the gun. His
motive — to gain revenge on Mork for “fucking around” with
source A — was fading because of a falling out source C had with
source A. The appellant pointed out that without source C’s help,
Mork would not “get done”. The appellant explained that source
C’s help would “help tons . . . especially the heat”. By encouraging source C to carry out the plan, the appellant abetted source
C’s proposed offence. Whether the appellant planned to use the
gun as evidence in the prosecution of Mork would not seem an
essential element of the offence, in light of the appellant’s plan
to “lock up” Mork “for several years”.
 In the result, the appeal from conviction is dismissed.