pursuant to s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code was entered by Justice of the Peace H. DeBacker on April 3, 2012, and again by
Justice L. Dean on June 22, 2012. In the Superior Court, case
no. CR-12-2661, the continuation of the non-publication order
from the Ontario Court of Justice was noted in an endorsement
on March 12, 2013.
 Section 486.4(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any
information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published
in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings
in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
( i) an offence under section . . . 271 [sexual assault] . . .
 The purpose of such legislation is to encourage the reporting of sexual offences which, in turn, aids the broader objective
of suppressing crime: see R. v. Adams,  4 S.C.R. 707,
 S.C.J. No. 105, at para. 24 (mandatory publication bans).
 There is nothing in the language of the statute which
purports to authorize a revocation of an order.1 Moreover, the
statute itself does not contain a “sunset” provision found in other
publication bans which automatically end the ban upon the
occurrence of an event: see, e.g., s. 539(1)(c) and (d) (preliminary
hearing evidence ban ends on the completion of the trial) and
s. 648(1) (ban on information heard outside the presence of
a jury during a jury trial ends when the jury retires to consider
its verdict). Thus, I am of the view that “once [a non-publication]
order is made it continues in effect until varied by a court having
jurisdiction to do so”: see R. v. K. (V.),  B.C.J. No. 3913,
68 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (C.A.), at p. 21 C.C.C.
 Yet the police defendants pressed, both in writing and
orally, for the entry of a new publication ban protecting the identity of the complainant in the criminal case. I decline for two
reasons. First, it is unnecessary. The publication ban entered in
the criminal case remains in full force and effect here. Second,
and most importantly, I fear any additional order, especially
as proposed by the police defendants, could sew confusion and
dilute the strength of the original order. The identity of the
1 In the context of a mandatory publication ban, the Supreme Court recognized a very limited power of a court to vary or revoke such a ban. Adams,
at paras. 29-30.