d. The Dagenais/Mentuck test
 In R. v. Mentuck,  3 S.C.R. 442,  S.C.J. No.
73, 2001 SCC 76, the Supreme Court reformulated the Dagenais
test. At para. 32, Iacobucci J. said:
A publication ban should only be ordered when:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper
administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will
not prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including
the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to
a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.
 This test applies to all discretionary court orders that limit the freedom of the press in relation to legal proceedings
( Toronto Star, at para. 7).
 The Dagenais/Mentuck test has two prongs. The first
is the necessity prong: the necessity of the publication ban
proposed. The second is the proportionality prong: a balance
between the proposed ban’s salutary and deleterious effects.
 The necessity prong itself has three important elements.
The first is whether there is a serious risk to the proper administration of justice. This risk must be serious and “well-grounded
in the evidence”: Mentuck, at para. 34. The second concerns the
correct assessment of the proper administration of justice in this
context. Courts must be cautious against an overly expansive
interpretation which would conceal excessive information (
Mentuck, at para. 35). The third seeks minimal impairment. Courts
should consider alternatives to a proposed ban which would
address the risk with fewer restrictions on the openness of the
court (Mentuck, at para. 36).
 Importantly, convincing evidence is required [Mentuck,
at para. 39]:
It is precisely because the presumption that courts should be open and
reporting of their proceedings should be uncensored is so strong and so
highly valued in our society that the judge must have a convincing eviden-
tiary basis for issuing a ban.
Generalized assertions alone are insufficient (Toronto Star, at
paras. 9 and 41).
e. Principles applied
 Here, the police defendants seek to seal Rule 20 motion
material pursuant to s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. C.43, which provides: