Although the respondent did not recall touching N.D.
(counts 2 and 3), E.P. (count 33), S.K. (count 41) or K.O. (count
43), the trial judge clearly believed the evidence of these complainants. Their evidence is consistent with the pattern of
behaviour that was described by the other complainants and
acknowledged in general terms by the respondent. As the trial
judge said in his similar fact ruling: “The fact that there was
touching at the time of the lessons it is really not the issue.”
I would therefore enter convictions on these counts as well.
 In accordance with the request by the Crown, I would set
aside the acquittals and enter a stay on counts 28 and 29. J.V. was
23 years old at the time she was touched by the respondent, and
there is an issue with respect to consent.
 The trial judge’s finding of fact that the respondent lacked
a sexual purpose is entitled to deference. The acquittals on the
sexual exploitation and sexual interference charges must stand.
 I would exercise the discretion under s. 686(4)(b)( ii) to
remit the matter back to the Superior Court. The appearance of
fairness requires that a different judge of the trial court determine the sentencing.
Appeal allowed in part.
Her Majesty the Queen v. Ibrahim
[Indexed as: R. v. Ibrahim]
2019 ONCA 631
Court of Appeal for Ontario, Rouleau, Trotter and Zarnett JJ.A.
July 26, 2019
Criminal law — Trial — Charge to jury — Reasonable doubt — Accused
claiming that he struck deceased with his taxi due to momentary lapse
of attention — Trial judge leaving liability for manslaughter based on
unlawful act of dangerous driving with jury — Trial judge failing to
explain how accused’s evidence could give rise to reasonable doubt in
relation to the mens rea required for dangerous driving — Evidence of
accused person’s state of mind may be capable of raising reasonable
doubt on whether the mental element of dangerous driving has been
established regardless of whether or not that evidence is accepted as
Criminal law — Trial — Mistrial — Trial judge dismissing defence
application for mistrial based on reasonable apprehension of bias —
Trial judge being critical of manner in which defence counsel brought
application and making unfounded allegations of professional misconduct